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Abstract. This paper analyzes the effect of the so-called ‘brain drain’ on economic growth through the channel of growth 
in total factor productivity. We analyze panel data that measure the severity of brain drain, which are from IMD and the 
U.S. National Science Foundation. Our analysis shows that middle-income countries have more brain drain compared to 
the group of high-income countries. Also, emerging economies that grow fast tend to experience more brain drain. Our 
results from fixed effects regression models show that that brain drain has a significant and positive impact on economic 
growth, and the main channel is productivity growth. This can be considered as evidence of the positive effects of ‘brain 
circulation’, which is one of the brain drain phenomena that settlement of the talents in advanced countries can eventually 
help improve the productivity of home country by the sharing of advanced technologies and skills around them with 
colleagues in motherland. Therefore, a strategy of utilizing overseas resident talents should also be considered, alongside 
the brain-attraction policy. 
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1. Introduction 
As globalization deepens, issues with brain drain are often discussed worldwide. Brain drain 
refers to a state or a phenomenon in which a country cannot utilize its effective labor of human 
resources or human capital. This phenomenon is largely divided into internal brain drain and 
external brain drain. Internal brain drain refers to the phenomenon in which domestic personnel 
with specialized skills are engaged in jobs unrelated to their majors, and external brain drain refers 
to the state in which competent talents of a country reside in other foreign countries, and their 
productivity contributes to the production of other countries. The brain drain to be addressed in 
this study is the second concept, the external brain drain. 
Whenever the ‘Brain Drain Index’ is announced at the International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) in Switzerland every year, developing countries have continuously raised 
serious questions about the negative impact of brain drain on economic growth as well as national 
productivity and competitiveness. The argument is that the more serious the outflow of competent 
human resources to foreign countries, the less experts and research personnel in the home 
country, and this results in the weakening of the country’s research and technology 
competitiveness and reduction of innovation, which in turn adversely affects economic growth. 
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On the contrary, some argue that brain drain may have a positive effect on the national 
economy and competitiveness. In South Korea during the 1970s, the ‘brain drain’ had even been 
regarded as an act of ‘traitoring’ and the students residing abroad after the completion of their 
studies were harshly blamed. However, in recent days, as described in Saxenian (2005) and 
Teney (2021), the practical concept of ‘brain circulation’ came up in which the students or workers 
who studied and were employed abroad do not return to their home country right away, but return 
after working abroad and acquiring advanced learning and skills, or contributing to the motherland 
through various human networks built up while living abroad. In this regard, brain drain is 
considered a positive phenomenon as the first step for the brain circulation. 
As such, there are not many studies that quantitatively analyze the direct relationship between 
brain drain and economic growth using growth regression models, although brain drain can be a 
major factor in economic growth, either through the leakage of human capital or through the 
technological progress from brain circulation. Therefore, in this study, we intend to supplement 
the prior study by conducting an empirical analysis of the effects of external brain drain on 
economic growth using growth regression models, while looking at the time series trend for brain 
drain situations of several selected countries. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Studies on the negative effects of the flight of skilled workers on the national economy and 
competitiveness are conducted by Grubel and Scott (1966), Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), and 
McCulloch and Yellen (1977). In addition, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) presented empirical 
analysis that since the 1990s, the migration of skilled workers (brain drain) has increased by a 
greater margin than that of ordinary workers, and explained the factors behind the brain drain. 
However, studies by Mountford (1997), Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997), Beine, 
Docquier and Rapoport (2001), and Cinar and Docquier (2004) suggest that the migration of the 
talents to advanced technology-holding countries could have a positive impact on economic 
growth and competitiveness in the home country. According to Beine et al. (2001), immigration of 
talents can have both a ‘brain effect’ when returning home after acquiring advanced technology 
and a ‘drain effect’ that occurs when not returning home, and when brain effect is large enough 
under the open economy model, brain drain can have a positive effect on economic growth. Stark 
et al. (1997) also presented a research that said the dissemination of skills and knowledge gained 
in advanced technology-holding countries could help improve the home country’s technological 
prowess when migrant talent returns. Cinar et al. (2004) also argued that the home remittance of 
competent people who moved to developed countries had a positive effect on economic growth 
of the home country, as is often seen in the cases of immigration of workers from developing 
countries. Moreover, Vidal (1998) explored brain drain’s positive effect on human capital formation, 
and Saxenian (2005) described the process of brain circulation from brain drain with lowered 
transaction costs associated with digitization, and how it ultimately helps the development of 
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technology in home country, using the data of Chinese- and Indian-born engineers in the United 
States (U.S.). 
More recently, Kang, Lim, and Hwang (2013) provided empirical evidence of brain drain’s 
indirect but positive influence on national competitiveness through R&D investment and 
accumulated human capital. Also, Lodigiani, Marchiori, and Shen (2015) showed that brain drain 
could have both positive and negative effects on GDP per capita through the technology diffusion 
at origin from the high-skilled diaspora, depending on the region’s relative distance to the 
technological frontier.  
Amid this widespread agreement and objection to the severity of brain drain, this study seeks 
to infer the effects of brain drain on economic growth and technological growth (a possible channel 





We were intrigued by the concept of ‘brain circulation’, one of the positive results from brain drain. 
As described in the above sections, talents who studied and were employed abroad can benefit 
their motherland through their acquisition of frontier technology and skills and sharing of their 
knowledge to their colleagues living in motherland, or co-workings with colleagues in home 
country.  
With an awareness that brain drain can adversely affect society in the sense of human capital 
flight, we hypothesized that brain drain could also have a positive effect on economic growth, as 
many other researchers claim. However, our main argument is more comprehensive. We 
hypothesize that brain drain helps achieve economic growth through productivity growth. Brain 
drain can induce brain circulation, and brain circulation helps home country’s technological 
progress. Technological progress ultimately improves productivity of production, and results in 
growth of income. 
Particularly, the total factor productivity (TFP) is predicted to be mostly affected by the brain 
drain via brain circulation and technology diffusion. TFP refers to the productivity of an economy’s 
composite inputs that are used to produce national output, and in neoclassical growth theory, 
economic growth rate converges to the growth rate of TFP in the long run (steady state). Thus, 
TFP can be a proxy for a country’s productive efficiency and technological level.  
TFP growth is one of the key components and channels for the economic growth in a simple 
growth model of 𝑌𝑌 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  where 𝑌𝑌  is national income, 𝑇𝑇  is total factor productivity, 𝑇𝑇  is 




= 𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑋𝑋
𝑁𝑁




= 𝑦𝑦 is national income per capita and 𝑋𝑋
𝑁𝑁
= 𝑥𝑥 is composite input per capita. When 
converting to growth terms, national income per capita growth (𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦) can be expressed as the sum 
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of growth of total factor productivity (𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 ) and growth of per-capita composite input (𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥 ) as 
described in equation [2]: 
 
𝑔𝑔𝑦𝑦 = 𝑔𝑔𝑇𝑇 + 𝑔𝑔𝑥𝑥                                [2] 
 
This implies that there are two main channels to which economic growth can be achieved: 
increasing growth rate of TFP or growth of composite input per capita. As the key hypothesis of 
this paper is that brain drain may enhance technology and productivity of home country through 
technological diffusion, testing the effects of brain drain on TFP growth will be the focus of our 
empirical analysis, as a channel to achieve income growth.  
 
 
4. Empirical landscape 
 
Before analyzing the data, we will look at the main explanatory variables of the paper along with 
the descriptive statistics (see Table 1). In this study, two indicators are used as key variables that 
can proxy the degree of brain drain. The first data was established using the ‘Brain Drain Index’ 
survey data from the World Competitive Executive Opinion Survey of the International Institute 
for Management Development (IMD) in Switzerland. The criteria number in IMD Competitiveness 
Yearbook is ‘3.2.21’ and its title is ‘Brain drain’. The survey question is “Brain drain ([of ]well-
educated and skilled people) does not hinder competitiveness in your economy”1 with a scale 
from zero to ten, and is asked to influential entrepreneurs worldwide. Recent years of data can 
be downloaded online at website of IMD World Competitiveness Online2, and the past data can 
be found in IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook series. As mentioned above, the index values 
of the original data are distributed from 0 to 10, and the more severe the brain drain is, the more 
negative impact it has on economic and management activities, and the closer it becomes to zero. 
In this study, the corresponding brain drain index values were subtracted from 10, so that the 
higher the brain drain is, the higher the values are. This newly defined IMD brain drain index is 
referred to as the ‘brain drain index’ in this paper. The indicator covers data from 61 countries and 
provides a total of 22 years of time series values from 1995 to 2016. This data is important in the 
sense that it can give information on how the entrepreneurs feel about brain drain of the country, 
as the entrepreneurs are the front-line agents who put the up-to-date technologies into practical 





                                           
1 The IMD World Talent Ranking Methodology (2019) 
2 https://worldcompetitiveness.imd.org/CustomSearch  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of brain drain index and share of doctorate recipients staying in the U.S. 
  Sample Size Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
No. of 
Countries Period 
Brain drain index3 1,174 4.779 1.582 1.04 8.85 61 1995~2016 
PhD ratios staying  
in the U.S. 287 0.628 0.167 0.10 0.92 41 2010~2016 







period) PhD ratios staying  
in the U.S. 210 0.609 0.145 0.21 0.92 
Note. Third and fourth rows are for common sample period (2010~2016) and sample country list (30 countries). Source: 





Table 2. Rankings of IMD Brain Drain Index by Country in 20164. 
Rank Country B.D. Index Rank Country B.D. Index Rank Country B.D. Index 
1  Hungary 8.44 22 Lithuania 5.97 43 Canada 4.20 
2 Venezuela 8.44 23 Argentina 5.90 44 Israel 4.17 
3 Bulgaria 8.04 24 Mongol 5.83 45 Iceland 4.08 
4 Ukraine 8.00 25 Jordan 5.78 46 Chile 3.94 
5 Croatia 7.84 26 Brazil 5.73 47 Belgium 3.89 
6 South Africa 7.23 27 Japan 5.58 48 Indonesia 3.76 
7 Slovakia 7.13 28 Spain 5.49 49 Germany 3.64 
8 Kazakhstan 7.05 29 Mexico 5.23 50 Britain 3.58 
9 Slovenia 6.85 30 France 5.22 51 Singapore 3.51 
10 Russia 6.75 31 Italy 5.14 52 Finland 3.46 
11 Greece 6.68 32 India 5.09 53 UAE 3.38 
12 Portugal 6.61 33 Ireland 4.93 54 Luxembourg 3.35 
13 Latvia 6.58 34 Rumania 4.55 55 Netherlands 2.80 
14 Poland 6.58 35 Turkey 4.49 56 Hong Kong 2.78 
15 Estonia 6.51 36 Cech 4.46 57 Denmark 2.75 
16 South Korea 6.40 37 Thailand 4.41 58 Sweden 2.70 
17 Taiwan 6.31 38 Qatar 4.41 59 USA 2.67 
18 Philippines 6.23 39 Austria 4.35 60 Swiss 2.03 
19 Columbia 6.07 40 Australia 4.31 61 Norway 1.68 
20 China 6.05 41 New Zealand 4.30       
21 Peru 5.98 42 Malaysia 4.28       
Note. Source: IMD World Competitiveness Executive Opinion Survey. 
 
                                           
3 Values were subtracted from 10. 
4 The higher the value, the more serious the degree of brain drain is. 
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The second brain drain proxy data are from the U.S. National Science Foundation's ‘Doctorate 
Recipients from U.S. Universities’ dataset, which can be downloaded from NSF website5. More 
specifically, the data we used are taken from the ‘Share of doctorate recipients with temporary 
visas intending to stay in the U.S. after doctorate receipt’. In this paper, we will refer all of the 
doctorate degrees in this data as ‘Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)’, though we are aware that not all 
doctorate-level degrees are Ph.D. degrees. Thus, we will call this variable as ‘Share of Ph.D.’s 
staying in the U.S.’ for convenience. The variable takes a value of zero to one, and covers data 
of U.S. Ph.D. recipients from a total of 41 countries over the world with the seven-year time series 
availability from 2010 to 2016. The U.S. universities’ Ph.D. graduates, who are considered to be 
the frontiers of advanced technology, can be classified as the ‘top-class’ professionals in their 
fields, and therefore, we postulate that the higher the percentage of them remaining in the U.S. 
is, the higher the level of brain drain their home countries face. 
 
4.1. IMD Brain Drain Index data 
First, Table 2 of IMD brain drain index rankings by country shows that Hungary, Venezuela, and 
Bulgaria are ranked the first, second and the third as of 2016. Not surprisingly, the upper-ranked 
countries are mostly middle-income or lower-middle-income countries, rather than the richest or 
poorest countries. As described in the table above, seven out of the top 10 countries, i.e., Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Russia, are Eastern European countries. This 
is likely to be the result of the recent increase in joins of these East European countries into the 
European Union, acquiring domestic labor’s freedom of movement and employment in advanced 
countries such as U.K., Germany, and France. 
We chose four countries, South Korea, China, Japan, and U.S. as samples to review time-
series trends of individual economies. We chose China because it is one of the fast-growing 
countries with largest population size in the world, U.S. because of its largest GDP and highest 
technology level with top-class quality of human capital, South Korea because it is known as a 
miraculous example case where education and human capital played important roles to escape 
from the ‘middle-income trap’ and achieve sustained rapid growth, i.e., ‘six-percent six-decade’ 
growth. Finally, Japan was selected because it is widely known that it has become a trend in 
Japan that Japanese students do not pursue doctorate program abroad, and at the same time, 




                                           
5 https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/doctorates/  




Figure 1. Time series of IMD brain drain index of South Korea, China, Japan, and U.S.A. Source: IMD World 
Competitiveness Executive Opinion Survey 
 
Figure 1 shows that China’s IMD brain drain index has been somewhat flat with some up and 
downs, but decreasing since 2013, while that of Japan has been rising. Moreover, in recent years, 
South Korea’s IMD brain drain index exceeded that of China (in years 2012, 2014, 2015, and 
2016). In 2016 South Korea was ranked 16th at 6.40, surpassing China’s 6.05 (20th). Also, it is 
interesting to notice that South Korea’s brain drain has leaped dramatically during the global 
financial crisis, in years 2007 and 2008, and since then, the trend is more or less flat, aside from 
the one-time negative shock in 2013.  
 
 
4.2. NSF Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities data 
 
Next, Table 3, the 2016 U.S. NSF’s ranking of the share of Ph.D. recipients staying in the U.S. 
after their completion in the course, tells that Iran, Bangladesh and Venezuela are at the top of 
the list. Unlike the IMD brain drain index, six of the top 10 countries are made up of Asian countries, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, China, and Taiwan, while only two Eastern European countries, 
Bulgaria and Romania, are listed in the top 10. Also, Venezuela, a South American country, and 
Nigeria, an African country, are ranked third and eighth, respectively. This is attributed to the 
absence of the effect of Eastern European countries’ membership status in the European Union. 
In other words, there are no visa problems for U.S. Ph.D. holders from Eastern Europe who have 
gone to settle down in the advanced European countries such as U.K. and Germany, and they 
are not counted and not reflected in this ranking. This is because the top universities and research 
institutes in Europe do not lag far behind compared to those of the U.S. in terms of research 
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Table 3. Rankings of Share of new Ph.D.’s Staying in the U.S. by Country in 20166. 
Rank Country 













1 Iran 695 0.911 22 Italy 167 0.659 
2 Bangladesh 185 0.903 23 Kenya 61 0.656 
3 Venezuela 27 0.889 24 Argentina 63 0.635 
4 Bulgaria 44 0.886 25 Spain 73 0.616 
5 Nepal 226 0.885 26 Columbia 187 0.615 
6 Romania 51 0.882 27 Mexico 222 0.613 
7 India 2,203 0.872 28 Germany 183 0.612 
8 Nigeria 111 0.847 29 Turkey 472 0.576 
9 China 5,534 0.809 30 Brazil 155 0.568 
10 Taiwan 593 0.779 31 Canada 407 0.565 
11 Philippines 51 0.765 32 Britain 115 0.548 
12 Vietnam 124 0.718 33 Japan 166 0.530 
13 Greece 84 0.714 34 Israel 83 0.518 
14 Ukraine 31 0.710 35 Pakistan 102 0.451 
15 Lebanon 58 0.707 36 Jordan 98 0.449 
16 Ghana 87 0.701 37 Indonesia 92 0.435 
17 Russia 108 0.694 38 Singapore 90 0.389 
18 South Korea 1,228 0.668 39 Chile 130 0.323 
19 Australia 42 0.667 40 Thailand 185 0.303 
20 France 105 0.667 41 Saudi Arabia 238 0.101 
21 Egypt 118 0.661     
Note. Source: U.S. National Science Foundation 
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows a different pattern in the number of Ph.D.’s between South Korea 
and China. Korea’s share of doctorate recipients staying in the U.S. sharply increases since 2013 
while that of China continuously drops since 2012. Moreover, the number of new Ph.D. graduates 
from Korea decreases since 2012, while that of China has risen continuously and significantly at 
least from the year 2010, showing the seemingly opposite trends. In Korea, a high percentage 
(52.4%) of doctorate holders are starting their research career as non-regular workers (Song et 
al., 2016)7, which are often discriminated against not only by the threat of job security but also by 
limitations to research activities, wages, children’s education supports, and welfare systems 
compared to the full-time positioned workers. 
On the other hand, since the 1990s, Chinese government started an initiative called ‘Thousand 
Talents Plan (TTP)’ or so-called ‘The Salmon Project’, of which the goal is to bring back 1000 
talents to China who have studied in advanced countries by providing exceptional benefits 
                                           
6 The higher the value, the more serious the degree of brain drain is. 
7 In 2016, 75.5% of South Korea’s new doctorate recipients are employed or confirmed to be employed, and among 
them, only 63.1% are employed for full-time regular positions, and 36.9% are employed for temporary (non-regular) 
positions. In sum, more than half (52.4%) of South Korea’s doctorate recipients are either unemployed or employed for 
temporary jobs. 
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including financial reward of one million yuan per person, housings, medical insurance, and even 
the high-quality education opportunities for their children. (Oh, 2016). 
This plan, which is also translated as the ‘The Recruiting Program of Global Experts’, aims to 
recruit world-class scholars, entrepreneurs, professional technicians and manager-level talents 
over the next five to ten years and deploy them to state-driven research projects, state-owned 
enterprises and banks, and industrial technology complexes (Lee, 2018). As a result of these 
efforts, many Chinese doctorate recipients appear to be returning to their home countries to settle 
down, and graduate students actively seek for Ph.D. study opportunities in the U.S. because they 




Figure 2. Number of U.S. Ph.D. recipients and the share of them intending to stay in the U.S. Source: U.S. 
National Science Foundation 
 
On the other hand, for Japan and Iran, the number of Ph.D. recipients and the share of Ph.D.’s 
staying in the U.S. move in the same direction. In Japan, both the number of Ph.D. recipients and 
the share of Ph.D.’s staying in the U.S. show downward patterns by 2015. In the case of Iran, 
both variables show a pattern of upward movement, and the gradients are steep. In particular, the 
number of U.S. doctorate recipients from Iran grows rapidly from 147 in year 2010 to 695 in 2016. 
Iran was selected as a new sample for analysis simply because its ‘share of Ph.D.’s staying in 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation analysis between brain drain index and selected macroeconomic variable. 
 
Variables8 Correlation Coefficient P-value 
Brain Drain Index Share of Staying in the US 0.519 0.000 
Brain Drain Index Total Factor Productivity -0.477 0.000 
Brain Drain Index GDP per Capita -0.452 0.000 
Brain Drain Index Human Capital Index -0.271 0.000 
Share of Staying in the US Total Factor Productivity -0.283 0.000 
Share of Staying in the US GDP per Capita -0.415 0.000 
Share of Staying in the US Human Capital Index -0.255 0.000 
 
4.3. Correlation Analysis of Brain Drain Indicators 
 
Table 4 shows the results of Pearson correlation tests between the brain drain variables and key 
macroeconomic variables. We are presenting this correlation analysis to show the landscape of 
macroeconomic data and their relationships with brain drain variables before moving on to the 
regression analysis. 
First, there was a strong correlation between IMD brain drain index and the share of Ph.D. 
recipients staying in the U.S. The higher the share of Ph.D.’s staying in the U.S. is, the higher the 
brain drain index is. In addition, both variables have negative correlation with the key 
macroeconomic growth variables, i.e., total factor productivity, per capita GDP, and human capital 
index. The more technically advanced, or the more productive the countries are, the richer the 
countries are, and the higher the human capital index is, the less brain drain there is. 
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1. Model Specification 
 
In this study, we use these two variables described earlier, IMD’s ‘brain drain index’ and NSF’s 
‘share of Ph.D.’s staying in the U.S.’ as key explanatory variables and explain the economic 
growth and total factor productivity growth using fixed-effects linear regression models. The 
growth regression models are represented by the following six reduced-form equations such that: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 1:  𝑔𝑔_𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡                  [3] 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 2:  𝑔𝑔_𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡                  [4] 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 3:  𝑔𝑔_𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 ,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡        [5] 
                                           
8 Total factor productivity index is ‘ctfp’ from Penn World Table (PWT) 9.1 (Feenstra RC, Inklaar R & Timmer MP, 2015), 
GDP per capita is ‘rgdpe/pop’ from PWT, human capital index is ‘hc’ from PWT. 
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𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 4:  𝑔𝑔_𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡                   [6] 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 5:  𝑔𝑔_𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡                   [7] 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 6:  𝑔𝑔_𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾0𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 + 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡        [8] 
 
where 𝑔𝑔_𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 and 𝑔𝑔_𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡~𝑡𝑡+5 are average annual growth rates of home country 𝑖𝑖 ’s income 
(per-capita GDP) and total factor productivity from year 𝑡𝑡 to year 𝑡𝑡 + 5, respectively. 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denote country 𝑖𝑖’s Brain Drain Index and share of doctoral graduates staying in the U.S. 
at year 𝑡𝑡, respectively. 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents the number of U.S. Ph.D. recipients of country 𝑖𝑖 in 
year 𝑡𝑡. This term is included to control for the differences in capacities of sample countries to 
send their students for U.S. doctoral programs. 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a set of external environmental and policy 
variables that may affect the dependent variables, namely, lagged income (lagged GDP per 
capita), years of schooling, fertility rate, investment to GDP ratio, government spending to GDP 
ratio, trade openness, and terms of trade change. These variables are often used in literature with 
conventional growth regression models such as Barro (2016) and Lee (2017). Moreover, 𝜈𝜈𝑡𝑡 and 
𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖  are included to control for the year- and country-specific fixed effects, respectively. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡 
represents the error term. 
The followings are summary statistics of variables used in regression analysis. Table 5 is a 
summary statistics table for the regression models that use IMD brain drain data, and Table 6 is 
the table for the models that use NSF Doctorate Recipients from U.S. Universities data. Since 
IMD data contains more country samples with a longer time span, the regression models that use 
this data have more observations than those that use NSF data. The correlation matrices of all 
used variables are presented in the appendix (see Table A1 and Table A2). 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for Model 1 and Model 4 (1993~2017, 61 Countries).9  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per Capita Growth* 1,342 0.034 0.035 -0.133 0.230 
TFP Growth* 1,320 0.003 0.028 -0.146 0.125 
Brain drain index 1,361 4.80 1.52 1.33 8.56 
Lagged income** (USD) 1,525 23,589 17,852 1,170 136,890 
Years of schooling 1,464 9.95 2.20 3.29 13.55 
Fertility rate 1,500 1.90 0.64 0.93 4.93 
Investment/GDP 1,525 0.248 0.069 0.002 0.640 
Government spending/GDP 1,525 0.182 0.064 0.037 0.423 
Trade openness 1,525 0.800 0.693 0.068 5.457 
Terms of trade change 1,525 0.005 0.064 -0.060 1.789 
*: Average annual growth rate from year t to year t+5. **: Value of income for year t-5 
 
                                           
9 GDP per capita (or income) is ‘rgdpe/pop’ from PWT, years of schooling is ‘yr_sch’ from PWT, investment to GDP ratio 
is ‘csh_i’ from PWT, government spending to GDP ratio is from ‘csh_g’ from PWT, trade to GDP ratio is ‘csh_x-csh_m’ 
from PWT, the terms of trade is ‘pl_x/pl_m’ from PWT, and fertility rate is from World Development Indicator’s ‘Fertility 
Rate’ variable. 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Models 2, 3, 5, and 6 (2008~2017, 41 Countries) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per Capita Growth* 287 0.022 0.033 -0.133 0.101 
TFP Growth* 245 -0.002 0.027 -0.146 0.056 
Share of staying in US 410 0.626 0.160 0.122 0.904 
Number of US Ph.D. recipients 410 333 780 28 5,454 
Lagged income** 410 18,570 14,789 1271 72,583 
Years of schooling 360 9.11 2.69 3.11 13.55 
Fertility rate 400 2.23 0.96 1.19 5.90 
Investment/GDP 410 0.238 0.075 0.076 0.501 
Government spending/GDP 410 0.165 0.047 0.059 0.336 
Trade openness 410 0.528 0.451 0.084 3.251 
Terms of trade change 410 0.013 0.122 -0.042 1.789 
*: Average annual growth rate from year t to year t+5 




Table 7 shows the results of linear regression analysis that explain the growth rate of GDP per 
capita and the growth rate of total factor productivity. All variables take five-year (plus and minus 
2 years) moving average forms to rule out the short-term shocks and capture the long-term trend. 
As mentioned above, the dependent variables, GDP per capita growth and TFP growth, are 
generated by calculating growth rates from year 𝑡𝑡 to year 𝑡𝑡 + 5 to see the future (five-year-later) 
effects of brain drain. The control variable ‘Ln (Lagged Income)’ took the lagged form, which uses 
the value of the year five years ahead (𝑡𝑡 − 5).  
The analysis shows that both the brain drain index and the share of Ph.D.’s staying in the U.S. 
have significant and positive effects on economic growth and productivity growth. Models that 
have TFP growth as the dependent variable (models 4, 5, and 6) show greater regression 
coefficients for key explanatory variables than the models with GDP per capita growth. This 
implies that brain drain more affects TFP growth and suggest that the main channel of brain drain 
affecting economic growth is likely to be the productivity growth. In other words, since brain drain 
does not directly affect income growth, but via TFP growth, the regression coefficient on TFP turns 
out to be stronger, and this is on the same line with our hypothesis. Also, the differences of fit (R-
squared and adjusted R-squared) are higher for models with ‘share of staying in U.S.’ variable 
(models 2, 3, 5 and 6), implying that these models better explain the effects of brain drain 
compared to other models. In addition, the inclusion of controls for the number of U.S. Ph.D. 
recipients does not alter the regression result, suggesting that the possible sample selection 
issues related to the magnitude of doctorate recipients are well-controlled. 
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Table 7. Results of linear regression of economic and total productivity growth. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 GDP per Capita Growth (t+5) TFP Growth (t+5) 
Brain Drain Index 0.012** (0.012)   
0.013*** 
(0.003)   







Ln (Number of US  
Ph.D. Recipients)   0.0004   0.002 
Ln (Lagged Income) -0.041*** 0.010 0.010 -0.028*** -0.003 -0.003 
Ln (Years of Schooling) -0.033 -0.003 -0.004 -0.015 0.011 0.006 
Ln (Fertility Rate) -0.045*** -0.014 -0.014 -0.021* -0.008 -0.006 
Ln (Investment/GDP) -0.031*** -0.016 -0.016 0.013** 0.017 0.018 
Ln (Gov. Sp. /GDP) -0.003 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.014*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
Ln (Trade Openness) 0.031*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 0.030*** -0.046* -0.047* 
Terms of Trade Chg. -0.096 -0.257** -0.257** 0.164* -0.072 -0.071 
Country & Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1,156 273 273 1,150 238 238 
R-squared 0.406 0.801 0.801 0.308 0.735 0.735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.357 0.754 0.753 0.252 0.669 0.667 
Note. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Values in parenthesis are p-values; ‘Brain Drain Index’ and ‘Share of Staying in 
U.S.’ are in natural logarithm terms. 
 
However, in model 1, investment to GDP ratio shows a strong and negative relationship with 
per capita GDP growth rate, and in models 2 and 3, trade openness has strong and negative 
regression coefficients, and thus, these models seem to be disqualifying to be established as 
benchmark models and show possibilities of needs for other control variables. On the other hand, 
the correlation coefficients of models 4, 5, and 6 seem to be consistent with the conventional 
growth regression models. 
Lastly, the authors are acknowledging the potential weakness of the result that even with the 
year-specific fixed effects method, due to the moving average forms of the variables, there may 
be a possibility of issues with autocorrelation across time. Also, a more thorough analysis can be 
conducted with the inclusion of factors that determines the decision of the talented to study abroad 
in the U.S., as well as the decision to stay in the U.S. or return to the home country. For example, 
the following factors, which are not considered in this paper’s empirical analysis, may improve the 
models: the baseline living conditions of home country, job and income prospects in the U.S. 
compared to those of home countries, cultural differences, cost of living in the home countries. 
 






According to our international comparisons of brain drain, the patterns of brain drain vary from 
country to country. Particularly, South Korea and China show stark differences. South Korea’s 
human resource outflow continuously increases and deepens while China's talent outflow is 
showing a marked decline. Korean media often argue that the deepening of this pattern will 
reduce the relative quality of South Korea’s human capital, and that of China will continue to 
accumulate and surpass Korea’s level soon. In general, middle-income countries rather than high-
income group have more brain drain. Also, emerging economies that grow fast tend to experience 
more brain drain.  
However, the results of growth regression analysis show that so-called brain drain has a 
significant impact on both economic growth and productivity (TFP) growth, implying that brain 
drain does not always affect the economy in a negative way. Moreover, brain drain has shown to 
have a more positive association with productivity growth, suggesting that the main channel of 
brain drain inducing economic growth is likely to be the productivity growth. This can be 
considered as evidence of the positive effects of ‘brain circulation’, which is one of the brain drain 
phenomenon that settlement of the talents in advanced countries can eventually help improve the 
productivity of home country by sharing of advanced technologies and skills around them with 
colleagues in motherland. 
Therefore, from a policy point of view, a two-track strategy is suggested to simultaneously 
pursue measures to maximize the improvement of national level of technology, which emphasizes 
the utilization of overseas resident talents alongside the brain-attraction policy. In this context, 
developing nations should try avoiding the unconditional brain-attraction policy. Furthermore, the 
support policies to raise the quality of research institutes and universities to the world-class level, 
as well as policies that encourage talents-sharing with global frontier firms will also help improve 
the home country’s technological prowess through technology and knowledge diffusion in the long 
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Table A1. Correlation Matrix for Variables of Models 1 and 4. 
  Var1 Var2 Var3 Var4 Var5 Var6 Var7 Var8 Var9 
          
Var2 0.667 1.000        
 (0.000)         
          
Var3 0.136 0.060 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.041)        
          
Var4 -0.327 -0.219 -0.448 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
          
Var5 -0.170 0.039 -0.261 0.427 1.000     
 (0.000) (0.153) (0.000) (0.000)      
          
Var6 0.041 0.008 0.163 -0.231 -0.509 1.000    
 (0.136) (0.779) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
          
Var7 -0.181 -0.085 -0.353 0.409 0.008 -0.087 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.766) (0.001)    
          
Var8 0.268 0.143 0.361 -0.405 0.094 -0.141 -0.413 1.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
          
Var9 -0.022 -0.025 -0.244 0.397 0.266 -0.305 0.391 -0.155 1.000 
 (0.412) (0.371) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
          
Var10 -0.069 -0.105 0.128 -0.028 -0.035 0.038 -0.017 0.038 -0.045 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) (0.177) (0.139) (0.503) (0.134) (0.077) 
Note. Values in parentheses are p-values; Var1: GDP per capita growth; Var2: TFP growth; Var3: IMD brain drain index; 
Var4: lagged income; Var5: years of schooling; Var6: fertility rate; Var7: investment to GDP ratio; Var8: government 
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Table A2. Correlation Matrix for Variables of Models 2, 3, 5, and 6. 
  Var1 Var2 Var3 Var4 Var5 Var6 Var7 Var8 Var9 Var10 
           
Var2 0.866 1.000         
 (0.000)          
           
Var3 0.154 0.057 1.000        
 (0.009) (0.378)         
           
Var4 0.198 0.031 0.251 1.000       
 (0.001) (0.635) (0.000)        
           
Var5 -0.084 0.094 -0.400 -0.098 1.000      
 (0.155) (0.144) (0.000) (0.048)       
           
Var6 -0.032 0.209 -0.252 -0.112 0.747 1.000     
 (0.592) (0.001) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000)      
           
Var7 -0.196 -0.294 0.082 -0.145 -0.487 -0.560 1.000    
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.104) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)     
           
Var8 0.157 0.003 -0.079 0.568 0.222 -0.005 -0.330 1.000   
 (0.008) (0.967) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (0.930) (0.000)    
           
Var9 -0.058 0.287 -0.084 -0.156 0.233 0.523 -0.361 -0.222 1.000  
 (0.328) (0.000) (0.090) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
           
Var10 0.019 0.042 -0.323 -0.058 0.688 0.488 -0.361 0.320 0.009 1.000 
 (0.753) (0.512) (0.000) (0.246) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.862)  
           
Var11 -0.034 0.060 0.108 -0.036 -0.020 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.072 -0.072 
  (0.570) (0.349) (0.029) (0.463) (0.694) (0.934) (0.963) (0.948) (0.146) (0.144) 
Note. Values in parentheses are p-values; Var1: GDP per capita growth; Var2: TFP growth; Var3: share of staying in 
U.S.; Var4: number of U.S. Ph.D. recipients; Var5: lagged income; Var6: years of schooling; Var7: fertility rate; Var8: 
investment to GDP ratio; Var9: government spending to GDP ratio; Var10: trade openness; Var11: terms of trade change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
